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* This paper synthesizes and updates some of our earlier work on German and European macroeconomic 
performance since the start of the EMU convergence process (Hein/Schulten/Truger 2005, Hein/Truger 2005, 
2005a, 2005b). Many thanks to Waltraud Schelkle for helpful comments. Remaining errors are, of course, ours.   2
1. Introduction 
From 2001 until present the German economy has been facing its most serious stagnation in 
post-war history: After the upswing in 1999/2000 real GDP growth more or less stagnated 
from 2001 to 2003. 2004 has seen a weak recovery with a growth rate of 1.6 percent, but in 
2005 growth will again decelerate according to the most recent forecasts.
1 Unemployment has 
been rising again and has now reached its post war maximum. The budget deficit, though not 
excessively high in international comparison, has been rising despite strong consolidation 
efforts since 2001. In 2004 it has exceeded the 3 percent (of GDP) deficit limit of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact for the third time in three consecutive 
years. And in 2005 Germany will also not manage to keep within the 3 percent limit 
according to the recent European Commission’s spring forecast (European Commission 
2005a). 
Of course, also the other European countries are currently facing economic problems and the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) as a whole has been doing worse than the US,
2 but in 
comparison to the other EMU countries Germany has been hit much harder by the recent 
economic slowdown (Table 1). During the period 2001-2004 average annual GDP growth in 
Germany has amounted to only half of the meagre growth in the EMU (including Germany). 
In contrast to the EMU as a whole, Germany’s growth is completely driven by export 
surpluses; the contribution of domestic demand to GDP growth has been negative on average 
over this period. Unemployment has climbed to the EMU average and inflation is 
considerably below EMU average. The former key currency country of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) has indeed become ‘Europe’s sick man’. 
 
Table 1: Real GDP growth, unemployment and inflation rate in Germany and the EMU, 
 2001-2004, annual averages in percent 
 Germany  EMU 
Real GDP growth  0.6  1.3 
     Growth contribution of 
     domestic demand  -0.4  1.1 
     Growth contribution of  
     net foreign balances  1.0  0.2 
Rate of unemployment  8.5  8.5 
Inflation rate (HICP)  1.5  2.2 
Sources: European Commission (2005), OECD (2004), authors’ calculations 
 
                                                 
1 According to the Eureopean Commission’s spring forecast, Germany’s growth rate will be 0.8 percent in 2005 
(European Commission 2005b). 
2 See Hein/Niechoj (2005) for a comparison of economic performance of the EMU with the US since the mid 
1980s.   3
There has been a lively discussion about the reasons for the German crisis and about how to 
overcome it. With few exceptions, however, mainstream researchers seem to agree that 
institutional sclerosis, i.e. rigid and over-regulated labour markets and too generous welfare 
state institutions have driven Germany into crisis. Consequently, there are many who have 
called and still call for far reaching structural reforms, radical deregulation of the labour 
market and radical dismantling of the welfare state.
3 Alternative macroeconomic explanations 
and policy advice are hardly ever considered seriously and are often dismissed as pure 
attempts to prevent the (perceived) urgently necessary process of structural reforms. The 
proponents of radical deregulation have been politically successful: After some reluctance 
during the first term of the red-green administration (1998-2002) chancellor Schroeder’s 
‘Agenda 2010’ presented in March 2003 has been the turning point towards the 
implementation of far reaching structural reforms to overcome the (perceived) institutional 
sclerosis (Schroeder 2003). 
In the present paper we fundamentally challenge the institutional sclerosis explanation of the 
German crisis. Instead, we will present a macroeconomic explanation for Germany’s falling 
behind which is indeed not a short-run phenomenon but has set in almost ten years ago. Our 
macroeconomic story will focus on the combined effects of too restrictive monetary policies, 
too restrictive and sometimes pro-cyclical fiscal policies and too moderate wage policies in 
Germany since the mid 1990s. This view is broadly consistent with modern macroeconomics 
and with empirical data. From this perspective we will finally argue that instead of further 
‘structural reforms’ Germany urgently needs more expansive fiscal and monetary policies in 
the short run. In the medium run the economic and institutional conditions for nominal wage 
growth in Germany according to the sum of long run national productivity growth and the 
ECB’s inflation target have to be improved. Further pursuing a policy of structural reforms 
with respect to the labour market and the social benefit system in combination with a 
restrictive macroeconomic policy mix, however, will prolong Germany’s economic stagnation 
and will considerably increase the risk of deflation. 
In this paper we will not explicitly address the problem of German unification and its effects 
on German stagnation.
4 But it should be noted, that there is a substantial discrepancy in 
macroeconomic performance between West and East Germany in terms of GDP growth and 
unemployment. West Germany’s growth rates have exceeded those of East Germany since the 
                                                 
3 See for instance the annual reports of the German council of economic experts (SVR 2003, 2004), the majority 
view in the semi-annual joint reports of the leading economic research institutes in Germany (Institute 2003, 
2004) and, in particular, an economic policy paper by the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank 2003). 
4 See Bibow (2003, 2005) for an extensive discussion of the effects of German unification and the 
macroeconomic reactions by the Bundesbank and by German fiscal policies in the course of the 1990s.   4
mid 1990s, i.e. the catch-up process of East Germany has virtually come to a stop since then, 
and East Germany’s unemployment rates are roughly three times higher than those in West 
Germany. This situation causes eminent fiscal transfers from West to East in the dimension of 
3-4 percent of German GDP. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 draws a short picture of Germany’s long-term 
economic problems with respect to growth, unemployment and inflation. Section 3 briefly 
deals with the institutional sclerosis view. Section 4 presents the alternative macroeconomic 
policy explanation of German stagnation. Section 5 deals with the development of wage 
bargaining in particular, and Section 6 concludes with the fundamental problems economic 
policies in Germany and Europe will have to solve in order to escape stagnation and deflation. 
 
2. Macroeconomic performance since the mid 1990s 
A closer look at the annual German GDP growth rates from 1985 to 2004 in comparison with 
the EMU average growth rates (including Germany) reveals that there is not only a short-term 
growth problem starting with the recent recession, but that Germany has faced a long-term 
absolute and relative growth problem since the mid 1990s (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Real GDP growth rate in Germany and in the 
EMU, 1985 - 2004, in percent
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Since 1995 the German GDP growth rate has been systematically lower than the EMU 
average. In what follows we will therefore compare macroeconomic development and its 
determinants in Germany and in the EMU as a whole for two different time periods: the ten 
years period starting with 1995 and the ten years period before 1995 (Table 2). Both periods 
include a recession and cover a full business cycle. Average values can therefore be compared 
without being affected too much by cyclical fluctuations. 
 
Table 2: Real GDP growth, unemployment and inflation in the Germany and the EMU, 1985-
1994 and 1995-2004, annual averages in percent 
1985-1994
1) 1995-2004   
Germany EMU  Germany  EMU 
Real GDP growth   2.8  2.4  1.3  2.1 
   Growth contribution 
   of domestic demand 
2.6 2.4  0.8  1.9 
   Growth contribution 
   of net foreign 
   balances 
0.2 0.0  0.5  0.1 
Rate of unemployment  6.1  8.8  8.3  9.4 
Inflation rate (HCPI)  2.5  4.1  1.3  2.0 
Notes: 
1) 1985 until 1991: West Germany and EMU including only West Germany 
Sources: European Commission (2005), OECD (2004), authors’ calculations 
 
Comparing the 1995-2004 period with the 1985-1994 period, Germany’s average real GDP 
growth rate has decreased remarkably. Whereas it exceeded the EMU average in the former 
period it is considerably below this average - which has also slightly fallen - in the latter 
period. EMU GDP growth has been driven almost exclusively by domestic demand in both 
periods. In Germany, however, the growth contribution of net foreign demand has increased 
significantly whereas the growth contribution of domestic demand has dramatically 
decreased. Germany’s economy has performed very well on international markets and has 
gained considerable export surpluses in the period 1995-2004, but has suffered from weak 
domestic demand in this period. 
Germany’s growth problems have caused rising unemployment. Although average 
unemployment in the period 1995-2004 is still below the EMU average, the increase in 
Germany’s unemployment rate from the first to the second period exceeds the increase in the 
EMU rate. Since 2003 Germany’s unemployment rate has been even higher than the EMU 
rate. With the exception of 1992 and 1993 Germany’s inflation rate has been consistently   6
below the EMU rate. The rate of inflation has halved comparing the second with the first 
period in Germany as well as in the EMU as a whole. 
 
3. Institutional sclerosis as the cause of Germany’s stagnation? 
For most of the German economics profession the answer to the German growth and 
employment problems is clear and simple: Institutional sclerosis, i.e. rigid and over-regulated 
labour markets and too generous welfare state institutions have driven Germany into crisis. 
This institutional sclerosis view is based on simple neoclassical labour market theory. With a 
complete and perfect neoclassical labour market as standard of reference unemployment can 
only arise because of market imperfections preventing a market clearing real wage at full 
employment (Siebert 1997).
5 Institutions of collective wage bargaining (unions and 
employers’ associations on the regional, sectoral or national level), labour market regulation 
(e.g. employment protection legislation, minimum wages) and the welfare state 
(unemployment benefits, social benefits and the ‘tax wedge’) are seen as market 
imperfections and therefore creators of unemployment. 
But can the institutional sclerosis view really explain the systematic lagging behind of 
German growth rates in comparison with the EMU average since the mid 1990s? In order to 
render a good explanation for the German crisis, the institutional sclerosis view would have to 
obey to three conditions: First, it would have to be based on a consistent and realistic 
economic theory. Second, the derived theoretical relationship between labour market 
regulation and welfare state institutions, on the one hand, and unemployment, on the other 
hand, should have been confirmed by empirical studies. Third, in order to be applicable to the 
German case it would have to be shown, that German labour market and welfare state 
institutions are in fact as sclerotic as to fit to the German economic performance since the mid 
1990s. However, the institutional sclerosis view does not convincingly obey to any of the 
three conditions.
6
First, with respect to theory, the institutional sclerosis view runs into serious problems, as 
soon as the traditional model of a complete neoclassical labour market as a standard of 
reference is abandoned and replaced by the models of modern labour market theory. With 
modern theoretical foundations it becomes difficult to derive unambiguous implications 
concerning the employment effects of labour market regulation and welfare state institutions. 
As soon as asymmetric information between employers and employees, incomplete contracts 
                                                 
5 Note that in this approach it is unemployment which lowers the growth rate and not low growth which is 
responsible for rising unemployment. 
6 For a more detailed discussion see Hein/Truger (2005).   7
and active price-setting are taken into account, there are good reasons to question the 
institutional sclerosis view and its economic policy implications.
7
Second, with respect to empirical research, the results from the literature are rather mixed and 
far from being as clear as the proponents of deregulation like to claim. Since the fundamental 
work by Layard/Nickell/Jackman (1991) there have been many complex econometric studies 
examining the influence of institutional rigidities on economic performance and the 
unemployment rate.
8 Among the standard institutional variables usually covered are indices of 
employment protection, the benefit replacement rate, benefit duration, union density, 
bargaining coordination and the tax wedge. All in all, the empirical work does not provide 
clear and unambiguous results in favour of the institutional sclerosis view concerning ‘rigid’ 
labour markets, welfare state institutions and unemployment. A considerable part of the 
unemployment differences over time and between countries cannot be explained by 
differences in the institutional structures of the labour market. Rather time and country 
specific factors and macroeconomic variables have to be taken into account. Finally, some of 
the results actually found in favour of the institutional sclerosis view do not seem to be 
particularly robust. 
Third, the development of Germany’s labour market and welfare state institutions in 
international comparison simply does not correspond to Germany’s economic development 
over time. In order to show this, we use the set of indicators compiled by Baker et al. (2004). 
Table 3 lists the six institutional indicators (index of employment protection, benefit 
replacement rate, benefit duration, union density, bargaining coordination and tax wedge) for 
Germany for eight five-year-periods from 1960 to 1999. It also shows the differences between 
the values for Germany and the average values for 20 OECD and 13 EU countries. 
                                                 
7 See for instance Nickell (1997), Nickell/Layard (1999) and in particular Schettkat (2003, 2003a). 
8 Baker et al. (2004) provide an excellent overview of the more recent econometric studies and demonstrate the 
lack of robustness of their results. See Hein/Truger (2005) for more details.   8
 























1960-64  0.45 42.7 0,57 33,8  2,5 42,9 
1965-69  0.80 41.9 0,57 32,4  2,5 42,8 
1970-74  1.54 39.7 0,58 32,5  2,5 46,7 
1975-79  1.65 39.6 0,62 35,1  2,5 48,3 
1980-84  1.65 38.8 0,62 34,9  2,5 49,7 
1985-89  1.63 37.8 0,60 33,4  2,5 50,5 
1990-94  1.50 37.4 0,61 31,0  2,5 52,2 
1995-99  1.30 36.3 0,60 27,4  2,5 53,9 





















11) -0.34 17.1 0.22  -4.9  0.29  6.3
12)
1965-69 
11) -0.05 13.0 0.22  -6.7  0.29  1.7
13)
1970-74 
11) 0.55 7.0 0.19 -8.9 0.26  1.5
13)
1975-79 0.53  -0.1  0.21  -10.4  0.20  3.2 
1980-84 0.50  -5.0  0.18  -10.5  0.37  1.8 
1985-89 0.48  -8.9  0.15  -8.9  0.49  -0.3 
1990-94 0.41  -10.1  0.12  -9.7  0.49  0.2
14) 
1995-99 0.34  -11.1  0.09  -12.0  0.58  1.8
14)





















11) -0.31 17.3 0.20  -5.9  0.23 4.0 
1965-69 
11) -0.08 12.2 0.22  -8.5  0.21 -0.8 
1970-74 
11) 0.43  5.6  0.19 -12.9 0.11 -1.1 
1975-79 0.33  -2.4  0.23  -15.9  0.10  0.6 
1980-84  0.27  -6.7  0.19 -16.5 0.30 -1.5 
1985-89  0.26 -10.1 0.15 -14.6 0.50 -4.8 
1990-94  0.21 -11.7 0.09 -15.4 0.37 -3.4 
1995-99  0.21 -12.5 0.05 -18.5 0.42 -2.3 
  Total indicator of institutional sclerosis
15)
  Germany  Average of 20 OECD 
countries 
Average of 13 EU 
countries 
1995-1999  52 47  52   9
Notes 
1)   An exact definition and a documentation of the origin of the data is given by Nickell et. al. 
(2002) and Baker et. al. (2004). 
2)  Index of employment protection legislation (0-2): 0 = low, 2 = high. 
3)  Benefit replacement rate before taxes as percentage of previous income before taxes. Average 
values for two income levels (100 % and 67 % of average income) and three family types 
(single, family with one earner, family with two earners), based on OECD-data. 
4)  Index of benefit duration: weighed arithmetic mean of benefit replacement ratios after 2 to 5 
years in proportion to first year benefit replacement ratio (see 3). Based on OECD data. 
5)  Index of trade union density: employed union members as percentage of total employed. 
6)  Index of wage bargaining coordination (1-3): 1 = low, 3 = high. Based on OECD data. 
7)  Total average labour tax burden (payroll taxes, social security contributions, labour income tax, 
consumption taxes). 
8)  Except for benefit duration: West Germany. 
9)  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
USA. 
10) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
11) without Portugal. 
12) without Portugal, New Zealand und Norway. 
13) without Portugal and New Zealand 
14) without Australia and Neuseeland. 
15) arithmetic mean of the six single indicators previously scaled to the interval [0; 100]. 
Source: Baker et al. (2004); Nickell et. al. (2002); authors’ calculations. 
 
Quite obviously the evolution of the indicators for Germany is not consistent with Germany’s 
economic development and is therefore in striking contrast to the institutional sclerosis view. 
If the latter were true one would expect the values for Germany to be very high in 
international comparison and increasing both absolutely and in international comparison over 
time, in particular during the 1990s when Germany entered its period of absolutely and 
comparatively unsatisfactory economic performance. However, only one indicator, the tax 
wedge, has consistently grown over time with considerable increases during the 1990s. Two 
indicators (bargaining coordination and benefit duration) have remained essentially constant 
since the mid 1970s. And three indicators have even decreased: Employment protection, the 
benefit replacement rate and union density have already been decreasing since the mid 1970s 
and have considerably been reduced further during the second half of the 1990s. 
The contradictions to the institutional sclerosis view become even more apparent when the 
indicators for Germany are compared with the average indicator values for 20 OECD and 13 
EU countries: In the second half of the 1990s two indicators for Germany (benefit 
replacement rate and union density) are lower than the OECD-20 average. In comparison to 
the EU-13 average, the former two indicators plus the tax wedge are below the average, 
though the values for the tax wedge are moving closer to the average. With respect to the 
German indicators above average, only for bargaining coordination the difference has   10
increased during the last 15 years. For employment protection and benefit duration the 
difference to the OECD-20 and EU-13 average has been continually decreasing since the 
early (employment protection) or the late (benefit duration) 1970s. In order to capture the sum 
of all relevant indicators and their changes over time, we have calculated an aggregate 
indicator for total institutional sclerosis from the individual indicators for Germany, the EU-
13 and OECD-20. As was to be expected from the individual indicators, Germany’s total 
indicator in the second half of the 1990s is a little above the OECD-20 average and exactly 
equal to the EU-13 average. To sum it up: On the basis of the data presented for Germany 
hardly any institutional change can be detected that could, according to the institutional 
sclerosis view, be made responsible for Germany’s poor economic performance since the mid 
1990s. 
 
4. A macroeconomic-policy story of Germany’s poor economic performance 
4.1 Macroeconomic policy coordination as key to growth and employment 
A macroeconomic-policy story of Germany’s slump can both rely on Post-Keynesian as well 
as on New Keynesian approaches.
9 In the two modern Keynesian views monetary, fiscal and 
wage policies have a common responsibility for employment and price stability. In order to 
attain these goals the three policies have to be coordinated at least at the national,
10 better 
even at the international level, in particular in currency areas with a common monetary policy. 
In the Post-Keynesian approach the development of aggregate demand determines growth and 
employment in the short as well as in the long run.
11 Monetary policies’ interest rate setting 
and firms’ profit expectations essentially affect private investment which in turn is an 
essential determinant of effective demand and macroeconomic growth. Fiscal policy is also a 
central short and long run determinant of aggregate demand working both through the tax and 
the expenditure channel, in particular through public investment. And it is effective demand 
which via the level of aggregate output determines the level of employment realised in the 
labour market. The labour market, in this view, is a derived market because wage setting has 
no direct influence on employment. Instead, employment is determined by the interaction of 
the financial market where the interest rate is set – mainly by the policies of the central bank – 
and the goods market where total output is determined. Nominal wages set by labour unions 
                                                 
9 See Snowdon/Vane/Wynarczyk (1994: 286-330, 367-380) for textbook reviews of the two approaches. 
10 A lot of papers have shown that a favourable coordination between monetary and fiscal policies rather than 
deregulated labour markets can be held responsible for the superior development of the US-economy during the 
1990s compared to Germany or the European economies (Fritsche et al. 2005, Hein/Niechoj 2005, Palley 1998, 
Solow 2000). 
11 See Davidson (1994), Heine/Herr (1999) and Lavoie (1992) for textbook presentations of the Post-Keynesian 
approach and Arestis (1996) for a survey.   11
and employers’ associations, however, are the crucial determinant of the price level and 
inflation: With labour productivity given or following an exogenous trend and mark-up 
pricing in incomplete goods markets, the nominal wage rate determines the price level when 
the mark-ups are constant. Whereas monetary and fiscal policies are capable of affecting 
effective demand and hence employment, wage policies are in charge of preventing 
cumulative inflation as well as deflation. Therefore, rigid wages have to provide the nominal 
anchor for the whole system of a monetary production economy. 
In New Keynesian economics effective demand and hence monetary and fiscal policies have 
at least a short run impact on production and employment because prices and wages are 
assumed to adjust rather slowly to their long-run equilibrium values.
12 In the long run 
equilibrium, however, unemployment is determined by the NAIRU (Non Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment), which may depend on those structural factors discussed in 
Section 3. In the short run, however, the exact duration of which is not clear, but which may 
be assumed to last at least a few years (Blanchard, 2003, p. 34), effective demand determines 
production and employment. From this it follows, that mainstream New Keynesian 
implications for monetary and fiscal policies in the short run are rather similar to the Post-
Keynesian approach: Monetary and fiscal policies are capable of stimulating demand and 
employment when the economy is in a slump and unemployment exceeds the NAIRU. 
Utmost importance is assigned as well to the coordination of the two policies (Blanchard 
2003: 101-4 and 431-2).
13
With respect to wage policies, however, the New Keynesian analysis differs substantially 
from the Post-Keynesian approach. In the short run, wage policy is strictly speaking not even 
a policy variable, because the short run is defined by exogenous and/or sticky nominal wages. 
And in the long run, wage policy is completely endogenous because mainstream models 
assume nominal wages adapting to the level consistent with the NAIRU (Blanchard 2003: 
113-33). In contrast to the Post-Keynesian view, nominal wage moderation can be an 
effective way to accelerate the reduction of actual unemployment to the NAIRU-level. In 
New Keynesian models, however, it is not clear how effective demand determining 
unemployment in the short run can adjust to the level of production associated with the 
                                                 
12 See Auerbach/Kotlikoff (1998), Blanchard (2003), Mankiw (2002) and Stiglitz (1997) for textbook 
presentations in the New Keynesian vain and Truger (2003) for a survey of macroeconomic policy implications. 
13 The requirement of coordinated monetary and fiscal policy intervention increases considerably if hysteresis is 
taken into account. With hysteresis the NAIRU is not stable but rather depends on the past development of the 
actual unemployment rate which can be affected by macro-policies (Ball 1999, Blanchard 2003: 283).   12
NAIRU in the long run.
14 In order to have increasing effective demand when nominal wages 
and prices are falling in the face of unemployment above the NAIRU, either a real-balance-
effect has to be assumed. This requires the dominance of exogenous or outside money which 
is not the case in modern monetary production economies. Or, if we assume the dominance of 
endogenous money coming into existence via credit creation, symmetric monetary policy 
interventions are required (Allsopp/Vines 1998). These may, however, not be sufficient to 
increase demand and employment when profit expectations are depressed and debt-deflation 
works its way through the private sector. Because of these considerations we prefer the Post-
Keynesian view of rigid nominal wages as a macroeconomic stabilizer rather than the New 
Keynesian view of nominal wages as an adjustment variable to the long-run equilibrium. 
 
4.2 Restrictive and ill-coordinated macroeconomic policies in Germany 
In order to provide a macroeconomic policy explanation for German stagnation, it must be 
shown that monetary, fiscal and wage policies for Germany have indeed been less favourable 
than for the EMU average since the mid 1990s as compared to the 10-year period from 1985-
1994 (Table 4).
15
                                                 
14 For a critique of the New Keynesian NAIRU approach from a Post-Keynesian perspective see Sawyer (2001, 
2002) and Hein (2004). 
15 It should be noted, that using the EMU average as a standard of reference does by no means imply that 
macroeconomic policies for the EMU have been optimal or adequate. On the contrary, EMU macroeconomic 
policies have in general suffered from the same problems as Germany: macroeconomic mismanagement and a 
lack of coordination (Hein/Truger, 2005a, 2005b, Hein/Niechoj 2005). Unfortunately German macroeconomic 
policies have even been worse.   13
 
Table 4: Macroeconomic policy indicators for Germany and the EMU, 1985-1994 and 1995-
2004, annual average values 
  1985 – 1994
1) 1995 – 2004 
  Germany EMU Germany  EMU
Monetary policy 
Short term real interest rate (percent)  4.0  5.1  2.1  1.9 
Short term real interest rate minus 
real GDP growth rate (percentage-points) 
1.2 2.7 0.8  -0.1 
Fiscal policy 
Number of years with pro-cyclical fiscal policy 









Real total government expenditure, growth rate 
(percent) 
3.5 3.1 0.7  1.3 
Real government investment, growth rate (percent)  1.2  2.1  -3.7  1.1 
Ratio of real government investment to real GDP 
(percent) 
2.7 3.0 2.0  2.6 
Wage policy 
Compensation per employee, growth rate (percent)  4.6  4.7  1.3  2.3 
Unit labour cost, growth rate (percent)  2.4  3.4  0.5  1.4 
Labour income share (percent of GDP at factor cost)  68.6  70.3  67.1  67.4 
Change in labour income share to previous year 
(percentage points) 
-0.1 -0.4 -0.3  -0.3 
Notes: 
1) 1985 – 1991: West Germany and EMU including West Germany 
Source: OECD (2004); European Commission (2005); authors’ calculations. 
 
Monetary policies 
Monetary policy will be assessed by the development of the short-term real interest rate. Of 
course, modern central banks use the short-term nominal interest rate as an economic policy 
instrument. But if central banks target inflation they will set nominal interest rates with an eye 
to the ensuing real rate. In order to take into account the underlying economic situation, we 
additionally consult the difference between the short-term real interest rate and real GDP-
growth. We expect a negative influence of real interest rates on economic growth working 
through different transmission channels (money, credit, asset prices, exchange rates) 
(Bernanke/Gertler 1995, Cecchetti 1995). 
With respect to monetary policies, Germany has lost its former status as the key currency 
country within the EMS at the start of EMU in 1999. Since then it has no longer been in a 
position to reap the advantages of lower interest rates it used to have compared to the other 
EMS countries. During the process of convergence these countries gained from a considerable   14
decrease of short- and long-term nominal interest rates towards the lower German level. This 
convergence and decrease in nominal interest rates was associated with a stronger decrease in 
real interest rates for the EMU average than for Germany over the 1990s. Since the German 
inflation rate has been lower than the EMU average and the nominal interest rates have almost 
completely converged since 1999, Germany’s real interest rates have even been higher than 
the EMU average since then. Whereas Germany had an average short term real interest rate 
advantage of 1.1 percentage points relative to the EMU average in the period 1985-1994, this 
constellation completely reversed in the period 1995-2004 when the EMU gained an average 
short term real interest rate advantage of 0.2 percentage points. The relation between the 
short-term real interest rate and the real GDP growth rate in Germany only decreased slightly 
from 1.2 percentage points in the first period to 0.8 percentage points in the second, whereas 
in the EMU as a whole this relation decreased considerably from 2.7 to -0.1 percentage 
points. From this it follows, that Germany in particular has suffered from European monetary 
integration and the ECB’s ‘anti-growth bias’ whereas the other countries have gained from 
monetary integration. The ECB’s ‚anti-growth’-bias consists of a too restrictive definition of 
price stability for the heterogeneous currency area - as an annual increase of the harmonised 
consumer price index of below but close to 2 percent (ECB 2003: 89) - and an asymmetric 
response to the expected deviation of actual from target inflation.
16 Germany’s weak 
performance, however, is only partly due to the ECB’s monetary strategy. It is also due to the 
fact that within the monetary union, the ECB can only address average inflation and cannot 
take into account Germany’s special economic situation with both a higher output gap and 
lower inflation than the EMU average. This is where the role of fiscal and wage policies have 
to be considered as well. 
 
Fiscal policies 
In order to capture the effects of fiscal policies on macroeconomic performance we focus on 
two measures. First, the extent to which fiscal policy exerts a stabilising or destabilising 
influence on the business cycle can be assessed by comparing changes in the output gap and 
the primary budget balance-potential GDP ratio (PBR). The output gap serves as an indicator 
of the current state of economic activity. If it is positive, then capacity is outstripped, if it is 
negative, this means that capacity is not fully utilised. Consequently, a positive change in the 
output gap indicates a cyclical upturn whereas a negative change points to a cyclical 
                                                 
16 The ECB has tended to tighten whenever inflation increased above the target without relaxing when inflation 
expectations came down. For a general critique of the ECB’s “anti-growth bias” see Bibow (2002) and Hein 
(2002).    15
downturn. While the overall budget balance is the result of the macroeconomic process and 
cannot be controlled by fiscal policy, the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance, the 
PBR, can be seen as a fiscal policy instrument.
17 If there is a negative change in the PBR, then 
structural deficits rise or structural surpluses fall, and fiscal policy provides an expansive 
stimulus to aggregate demand. If there is a positive change in the PBR, then structural deficits 
fall or structural surpluses rise, and fiscal policy provides a restrictive stimulus to demand. If 
the PBR remains constant when there is a change in the output gap, then fiscal policy is 
neither expansive nor restrictive and the automatic stabilisers are simply left to take effect. 
Second, we take a look at the development of real government expenditure, in particular at 
real government investment. In the short run government investment is an essential 
component of aggregate demand. Moreover it provides public infrastructure making it a key 
condition for growth in the long run. We assume a positive relationship between its growth 
rate and GDP growth.
18
Considering fiscal policies, the Maastricht Treaty and especially the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) have enforced budget consolidation and restrictive policies on (potential) EMU 
member countries at least since the mid 1990s. Since then German fiscal policies have been 
restrictive in four years (positive change in the PBR) in face of a slowdown in economic 
activity (negative change in the output gap), pro-cyclically worsening the crisis. For the EMU 
average, this has happened only twice. The restrictive stance of German fiscal policies 
becomes even more obvious if one considers the growth rates of real public expenditure and 
of real public investment, in particular. The growth rate of real total public expenditures has 
decreased dramatically from an annual average of 3.5 percent in the first period to only 0.7 
percent in the second period.
19 There has been a substantial decrease in the EMU rate as well, 
however, with an annual 1.3 percent it is still almost twice as high as its German equivalent. 
Even more dramatic is the development of German public investment since the mid 1990s. 
Real public investment expenditure declined with an annual rate of -3.7 percent, whereas the 
EMU as a whole managed to have an average annual increase of 1.1 percent. The German 
decline in public investment has led to a share of real public investment in real GDP which is 
very low, both in absolute terms and in comparison with the EMU average: After almost 
reaching the EMU level of about 3.0 percent of GDP during the first period it has continually 
                                                 
17 Using primary deficits puts into focus those components of public debt directly connected to effective demand. 
18 At least for Germany long-term positive growth effects of public infrastructure investment should be 
uncontroversial. See Kitterer (1998) and Pfähler et al. (1996). 
19 Also the growth rates of primary government expenditure have been below the EMU average since 1997. The 
same is even true for the growth rates of real social benefits.   16




Wage policies can be assessed by nominal wage growth (compensation per employee), unit 
labour cost growth and the labour income share. Nominal wage setting affects unit labour cost 
growth and inflation. If nominal wages increase at a faster pace than productivity plus the 
price level do, unit labour cost growth and inflation will speed up.
20 This will cause real 
interest rates to fall and may make the central bank increase nominal interest rates in order to 
reach its inflation target. If nominal wages increase at a rate below the sum of productivity 
growth and inflation, unit labour cost growth will slow down and cause disinflation. Finally, 
deflation may be the consequence. Deflation causes increasing real interest rates and rising 
real debts with negative effects on investment and growth. If deflationary processes have 
started, monetary policies lowering interest rates may be ineffective. 
Wage policies, however, may not only affect prices, but may also change distribution if firms 
do not completely pass unit labour cost variations to prices. Under these conditions nominal 
wage moderation causes the labour income share to fall. Empirical analysis for Germany and 
the EMU since the 1960s has shown, that the development of unit labour costs affects the 
development of output prices (Hein/Schulten/Truger 2005). The adjustment of the inflation 
rate to nominal unit labour cost growth, however, is incomplete. Therefore, nominal wage 
moderation is also associated with a tendency of labour income shares to fall. Hypothetically, 
the effects of income shares on GDP growth are ambiguous (Bhaduri/Marglin 1990). With the 
propensity to save out of wages falling short of the savings propensity out of profits, a falling 
labour income share means a cut-back in consumption with directly contractive effects on 
investment and GDP growth. A fall in labour income shares that is associated with nominal 
wage restraint would, on the other hand, improve international competitiveness and, therefore, 
stimulate demand for exports, investment and growth. With a slowdown in inflation, the 
central bank may also cut interest rates and stimulate investment and growth. Finally, a falling 
labour income share is associated with rising unit profits which may also improve investment 
and growth. Since the stimulating effects of wage moderation and declining labour income 
shares for investment and growth are rather indirect and uncertain, the direct and contractive 
effects may dominate. Therefore, nominal wage growth according to the sum of productivity 
                                                 
20 See Arestis/Sawyer (2003) and Hein (2002, 2004) for models of distribution conflict and inflation.   17
growth and inflation and hence constant labour income shares should be generally favourable 
conditions for growth. 
Germany’s too moderate nominal wage increases are the major cause for the below average 
inflation rate (Table 4): Nominal wage moderation has been more pronounced in Germany 
than in the EMU on average during the second period and has also forced unit labour cost 
growth and inflation considerably below the EMU average. However, slower unit labour cost 
growth and lower inflation can also be observed in the first period from 1985-1994 when 
Germany’s absolute and relative economic performance had been much better. But during the 
first period low unit labour cost growth and the resulting low inflation rates were the basis for 
the Deutschmark’s status as the regional key currency within the EMS, allowing the German 
Bundesbank to set substantially lower nominal and actually real interest rates than in the other 
EMS countries. Since the beginning of the interest rate convergence process in the mid 1990s 
and with the completion of EMU in 1999, however, lower inflation rates for Germany do no 
longer pay off in terms of lower interest rates. 
The overly moderate wage setting in Germany did not only cause below average inflation 
rates. This wage policy also contributed to the acceleration of a tendency of declining labour 
income shares which had already started in the first period (Table 4). This decline, however, 
can also be witnessed in the EMU as a whole. Redistribution at the expense of labour can 
therefore not add to the explanation of Germany’s relative performance compared with the 
EMU. However, this redistribution has contributed to the weak development of domestic 
demand and hence to Germany’s weak absolute performance since the mid 1990s. 
On the other hand, moderate wage policies have improved price competitiveness and 
profitability of German firms which made German export surpluses almost triple between 
2000 and 2003. Germany’s share in international trade improved making Germany the ‘world 
champion’ in exports in 2003 and 2004. But this extraordinary export performance was 
insufficient to compensate for the associated deficiencies in domestic demand, as has been 
shown above. 
 
A restrictive macroeconomic policy mix in Germany 
In sum, macroeconomic policy variables have indeed been less favourable in Germany than in 
the EMU since the mid 1990s. Macroeconomic mismanagement, therefore, can be considered 
to be the main cause of Germany’s slump. This is partly due to the integration of a former key 
currency country into a monetary union and the associated loss of the interest rate advantage, 
and is insofar inevitable. But it is also caused by the restrictive macroeconomic policy mix   18
implemented at the EMU level, which is particularly affecting a slowly growing low inflation 
country like Germany: the too restrictive ECB monetary policy strategy and the Stability and 
Growth Pact enforcing a restrictive stance on the member countries’ fiscal policies. And a 
major contribution to macroeconomic mismanagement has come from German wage 
developments. We will take a closer look at the reasons for this in the following section. 
 
5. Why has wage policy in Germany been so moderate? 
One of the key problems derived in the previous section is Germany’s below EMU average 
inflation rate, in particular since 1999. Below EMU average inflation has been caused by 
below EMU average unit labour cost growth which was not (and could not be directly) 
rewarded by the ECB’s monetary policy. Therefore, the German economy has been 
particularly hit by the too restrictive ECB monetary policy strategy, has suffered from above 
average real interest rates and has recently faced an increasing risk of deflation. 
Also the EMU as a whole has seen a downward trend in inflation and unit labour cost growth 
since the mid 1990s based on wage moderation (Table 4). Against a background of sustained 
mass unemployment the collective bargaining power of trade unions was substantially 
weakened. The most visible indicators of this were falling trade union membership and a 
significantly lower number of strikes and industrial disputes (Boeri et al. 2001, Schulten 
2004). In addition, the 1990s saw the emergence in many European countries of new 
corporatist competitive structures which, as a result of national social pacts and ‘alliances for 
jobs’ led to the trade unions becoming firmly tied into the political agenda and committed to a 
competitive wages policy (Fajertag/Pochet 2000). 
It should be pointed out, however, that wage trends in the individual EMU countries were by 
no means uniform during the 1990s, and in fact reflected the occasionally major differences in 
economic growth and employment trends between countries. Wage increases have been 
distinctly higher than the EMU average in some of the smaller EMU countries that achieved 
especially dynamic economic growth, such as Ireland, the Netherlands and recently also 
Spain. This has contributed to higher than average inflation as a result of these countries 
exceeding the national scopes for distribution (productivity growth plus inflation), in some 
cases by a considerable margin (Schulten 2002). 
The situation was somewhat different in the larger EMU countries, i.e. in France, Italy and 
Germany. While overall wage increases in Italy were slightly higher than the EMU average 
and slightly lower than the EMU average in France, in Germany they have remained 
consistently below the EMU average since 1996. Germany has been pursuing the most   19
moderate wage policy in the EMU since then, and given that it is the largest economy in the 
EMU, this has also exerted a downward pressure on EMU average wage increases (Table 4). 
In 2004 wage moderation in Germany has caused a fall in nominal unit labour cost growth 
which means increasing deflation risks in this country.
21
 

































1995 4.9  4.5 -0.4  4.9  2.5  2.4  1.7 
1996 2.6  3.0 0.4  2.8  2.3  0.5  1.2 
1997 1.5  1.0 -0.5  1.6  2.0  -0.4  1.5 
1998 1.9  1.4 -0.5  1.5  1.3  0.2  0.6 
1999 2.9  2.3 -0.6  2.0  1.5  0.5  0.7 
2000 2.0  2.8 0.8  3.3  2.2  1.1  1.4 
2001 1.9  2.7 0.8  2.5  1.4  1.1  1.9 
2002 2.7  2.1 -0.6  2.1  1.5  0.6  1.3 
2003 1.9  1.2 -0.7  1.6  0.7  0.9  1.1 
2004 1.3  0.2 -1.1  0.2  1.1  -0.9  1.7 
Notes: 
1) (1) minus (2) in percentage points 
Sources: Bundesbank (2005), Federal Statistical Office (2005), authors’ calculations 
 
The particularly low wage increases in Germany can be attributed to different reasons 
(Hein/Schulten/Truger 2005): 
a) First, there has been a lessening of the trade unions’ bargaining power. At the start of the 
1990s the trade unions were still able to achieve (too) high collectively agreed wage 
settlements on the back of the boom following German reunification, contributing to high 
inflation and to overly restrictive monetary policies by the Bundesbank. But since 1996 trade 
unions’ collective bargaining policy has been plunged into a major crisis and they have been 
forced to accept collectively agreed wage increases of under 3 percent and on occasion even 
under 2 percent (Table 5). 
b) The crisis of trade unions’ collective bargaining policy is shown even more clearly by 
actual earnings trends. In contrast to most other EMU countries, wage trends in Germany 
since the mid 1990s have been mainly characterized by a negative wage drift, with actual 
earnings growing even more slowly than collectively agreed wages. This is also a 
consequence of fundamental changes in the structure and operation of the German collective 
                                                 
21 See the IMF (2003) on deflation risks in Germany. For a more extensive discussion of deflation risks in 
Germany and the EMU see Hein/Schulten/Truger (2005).   20
bargaining system. One clear indicator of this is the decline in the number of companies and 
employees covered by collective agreements that has been observed since the mid-1990s 
(Schnabel 2003).
22 The negative wage drift seems to suggest that wage increases in 
companies not bound by collective agreements were significantly lower. 
c) Furthermore, even within the German collective bargaining system there are numerous 
indicators which suggest that the binding nature of collective agreements is being eroded, 
making negotiated collective wage increases harder to implement in practice and 
consequently favouring a negative wage drift. There is now a significant number of 
companies that are formally bound by collective agreements but which in practice do not 
comply with them.
23
d) In addition to the above, ‘hardship’ and ‘opening-clauses’ were introduced into virtually all 
of the major sectoral collective agreements in the 1990s, allowing companies to deviate from 
the terms contained in collective agreements under certain circumstances.
24
e) One final significant cause of the negative wage drift is the reduction of payments that are 
above the collectively agreed rate. A large number of companies in Germany continue to pay 
wages that are higher than those established in their collective agreement. Nevertheless, 
during the course of the 1990s, several companies began to use ‘company alliances for jobs’ 
to ‘compensate for’ the wage increases negotiated in collective agreements by cutting back on 
payments above the collectively agreed rate. This has led to the emergence of a new form of 
concession bargaining in which employees agree to give up established benefits in exchange 
for limited job security, thereby contributing to a substantial reduction in labour costs. 
 
6. The fundamental problems for German (and European) economic policies and wage 
bargaining 
We have argued that the main causes for Germany’s stagnation and its below EMU average 
economic performance can be found in a restrictive macroeconomic policy-mix enforced on 
the German economy causing serious problems of domestic demand. This is partly due to the 
                                                 
22 According to the IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) figures for 2001, only 48 percent of all 
companies in western Germany and 71 percent of all employees were bound by collective agreements, while in 
eastern Germany the figures were as low as 28 percent of companies and 56 percent of employees (Bispinck 
2003: 395). 
23 According to the results of the 2002 WSI Works Council Survey, which probably only covers part of the 
problem, 10 percent of companies occasionally failed to comply with the terms of current collective agreements, 
and a further 5 percent did so frequently. In the majority of these cases, the non-compliance involved failure to 
pay the collectively agreed wages (Bispinck/Schulten 2003: 159) 
24 Opening-clauses are now used by more than a third of all companies, although it is true that in the majority of 
cases these relate to the divergence of working time organization from the collective agreement, and the use of 
opening-clauses with regard to remuneration is for the time being still not very widespread (Bispinck/ Schulten 
2003: 160).   21
integration of the former key currency country into a monetary union, and it is insofar 
inevitable. But it is also caused by the restrictive macroeconomic policy mix implemented at 
the EMU level, which is particularly affecting a slowly growing low inflation country: the too 
restrictive ECB monetary policy strategy and the SGP enforcing a restrictive stance on fiscal 
policies. 
The stagnation caused by monetary and fiscal policies is aggravated by Germany’s excessive 
wage restraint. Nominal wage growth and unit labour cost growth since the mid 1990s have 
been significantly lower than the EMU averages, and this is to a large extent responsible for 
the below EMU average inflation rate and has recently caused serious deflation risks. 
Consequently, even a monetary policy that might be suitable for the EMU as a whole is too 
restrictive for a country where growth and inflation are as low as in Germany. Furthermore, 
the fact that nominal interest rates have converged across the EMU and inflation in Germany 
is below average means that German consumers and investors are faced with real interest 
rates that are higher than the EMU average. On top of this, excessive wage restraint has also 
led to an acceleration in the tendency of the German labour income share to fall, which has in 
turn further weakened domestic demand. 
The combination of a pronounced trend towards stagnation and significant deflation risks in 
the largest EMU country together with the ECB’s overly ambitious inflation target for the 
EMU as a whole represents a major challenge for macroeconomic policies and in particular 
for wages policies in Germany and in the EMU:
25
First, if Germany is to achieve an economic recovery with wage policies providing the 
nominal anchor, nominal wage growth will have to rise in order to achieve the sum of long-
term productivity growth plus the ECB’s target inflation rate. However, given the 
deterioration of the German wage bargaining system and the weak bargaining position of the 
trade unions, an increase in nominal wage and unit labour cost growth requires improved 
employment and higher GDP growth as a precondition. But more expansive macroeconomic 
policies at the national level generating more employment are difficult to achieve given the 
restrictions by the EMU policy mix. 
Second, even if German trade unions managed to increase nominal wage und unit labour cost 
growth, and if inflation in Germany rose, such a rise would lead to an EMU inflation rate 
above the ECB’s target as long as other EMU countries have inflation rates considerably 
above that target rate. Restrictive monetary policies will then be unavoidable as long as the 
                                                 
25 On the interaction of the ECB’s monetary policy with wage bargaining in Europe see Hein (2002).   22
ECB is not prepared to increase its inflation target substantially in order to allow the slowly 
growing larger economies more room to achieve a recovery. 
Third, if the ECB is not prepared to raise its inflation target, it will be necessary to reduce 
inflation in the other EMU countries in order to allow Germany to have more inflation. It is 
therefore important for the bargaining parties and in particular the trade unions to intensify 
their efforts towards European-level effective coordination of wages policy. The aim of this 
process should be for each country to increase wages on the basis of its long-term domestic 
productivity growth rates plus the ECB’s target inflation rate.
26 There are, however, major 
obstacles for wage bargaining coordination across Europe arising from the different degrees 
of coordination within the national bargaining systems, from the overall weakness of trade 
unions in Europe, from the tendency towards decentralisation of bargaining imposed by 
labour market policies, etc.. In addition, reducing inflation in the rapidly growing high 
inflation EMU countries would mean higher real interest rates and lower growth for these 
countries. 
From these consideration it follows first, that wage policies in Germany - although they have 
contributed significantly to German stagnation - in the short run are rather impotent when it 
comes to improving German growth and employment. Wage policies in Germany urgently 
need to be supported by more expansive fiscal policies and particularly monetary policies. 
Second, in the medium run the conditions for the achievement of nominal wage growth in 
Germany according to the sum of long run domestic productivity growth and the ECB’s 
inflation target have to be improved. Third, if it proves impossible either to convince the ECB 
to raise its inflation target or to coordinate wage policies across the EMU countries in the way 
described above, then in the medium to long run Germany’s stagnation and deflation risks are 
likely to spread increasingly to the other EMU countries. Excessive wage restraint in 
Germany will not only fuel national economic stagnation but will also put pressure on wage 
policies in the other EMU countries in the medium term if they lose competitiveness and their 
current account deteriorates. If wage policies start to be widely used to protect or improve 
price competitiveness, then further redistribution at the expense of labour, rising effective 
demand problems and the threat of deflation will spread accordingly. If this happens, then 
even a more growth-friendly monetary policy by the ECB might be ineffective and in the next 
cyclical downturn the deflation risks may become actual deflation - in Germany but also in 
the EMU as a whole. 
 
                                                 
26 For more detailed information on the current status and future prospects of the various trade union 
coordination initiatives, see Schulten (2003, 2004) and Traxler/Mehrmet (2003).   23
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